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Abstract
The existence of a security vulnerability in a system does not
necessarily mean that it can be exploited. In this research, we
introduce Autosploit —an automated framework for evaluat-
ing the exploitability of vulnerabilities. Given a vulnerable en-
vironment and relevant exploits, Autosploit will automatically
test the exploits on different configurations of the environ-
ment in order to identify the specific properties necessary for
successful exploitation of the existing vulnerabilities. Since
testing all possible system configurations is infeasible, we in-
troduce an efficient approach for testing and searching through
all possible configurations of the environment. The efficient
testing process implemented by Autosploit is based on two
algorithms: generalized binary splitting and Barinel, which
are used for noiseless and noisy environments respectively.
We implemented the proposed framework and evaluated it
using real vulnerabilities. The results show that Autosploit is
able to automatically identify the system properties that af-
fect the ability to exploit a vulnerability in both noiseless and
noisy environments. These important results can be utilized
for more accurate and effective risk assessment.
1 Introduction
Risk assessment is an activity essential for improving the
security of an enterprise network [15]. A traditional cyber
security risk assessment procedure begins with identifying
system assets and enumerating the threats to which those as-
sets are exposed. Next, vulnerability assessment tools are used
to reveal the existence of security vulnerabilities in system
components. This process is usually performed using vulner-
ability scanners (such as Nessus [1] or OpenVAS [10]) aimed
at identifying components or services that are vulnerable to
known attacks [20]. Based on the security vulnerabilities iden-
tified and the enterprise’s network topology, the attack surface
can be generated [4]. The attack surface represents the possi-
ble attack paths an attacker can take to compromise an asset.
Finally, given the attack surface, an optimal mitigation strat-
egy (such as hardening the system) can be implemented to
minimize the overall risk to the system.
The correctness and completeness of the attack surface is
highly dependent on the inputs from the vulnerability assess-
ment phase. The use of vulnerability scanners to identify the
presence of security vulnerabilities in a target system can be
performed automatically and continuously, and is relatively
safe (cannot harm the target system), since these tools do not
actually perform any exploitation.
However, vulnerability assessment that is solely based on
vulnerability scanners has one main limitation: it cannot guar-
antee that the vulnerabilities identified can be exploited. This
is because the exploitability of a security vulnerability de-
pends on the specific properties (i.e., configuration) of the
vulnerable system, which is not considered during the vulner-
ability scanning process. Examples of such properties are the
libraries installed, the services running (which are not bound
to the network), and the implementation of safeguards, such
as stack protectors.
Considering vulnerabilities that cannot be exploited in the
attack surface may enumerate attack paths that cannot be exe-
cuted by an attacker, which results in an incorrect allocation
of resources for countermeasures. Therefore, to conduct an
effective risk assessment process, it is essential to evaluate the
exploitability of known vulnerabilities for the specific system
configuration.
The most common approach for evaluating the exploitabil-
ity is penetration testing (PT), a goal-oriented simulation of
a cyber attack on a specific network, system, or software ap-
plication. PT aims at evaluating and demonstrating the ex-
ploitability of known vulnerabilities, as well as identifying
unknown vulnerabilities. However, PT is a time and resource-
consuming task, usually performed manually by security ex-
perts (using tools, such as Kali Linux [9]), and therefore, in
practice, it cannot be performed continuously.
A complementary method for evaluating exploitability is
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), an open
and widely adopted framework for quantifying the severity of
software vulnerabilities [16]. Given a software vulnerability,
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the CVSS provides a numerical score indicating the severity,
impact, and exploitability of the vulnerability. However, this
score is calculated for each vulnerability regardless of the
specific system configuration. It should be mentioned that
the CVSS provides a mathematical framework that can be
used to adjust the severity, impact, and exploitability metrics
based on the specific system configuration. In particular, the
environmental metrics enable security analysts to customize
the CVSS score based on specific characteristics of a user’s
environment (such as characteristics that affect exploitability).
However, the CVSS does not determine the characteristics
that are necessary for exploiting the vulnerability or provide
any guidelines for/means of measuring those characteristics
given a specific system configuration, thus leaving the se-
curity analyst with no practical solution. To the best of our
knowledge, an automated tool that can be used by security an-
alysts to measure those characteristics, given a specific system
configuration, has yet to be proposed.
In this paper, we introduce Autosploit — an automated
framework for evaluating the exploitability of security vulner-
abilities. Given a vulnerable environment and relevant exploit,
Autosploit will automatically test the exploit in different sys-
tem configurations in order to identify the specific properties
(e.g., installed packages, running services) that are necessary
to successfully exploit the vulnerability. This is done using a
dedicated simulator that automates the process of changing
the system configuration, exploiting the system, and collect-
ing evidence with respect to the success of the exploitation.
Since modern environments consist of multiple configurable
parameters, a straightforward approach in which all possible
parameters are tested individually is very time-consuming
and therefore impractical. The proposed method takes an effi-
cient approach for testing and searching through the system
configurations. The approach is based on two algorithms: gen-
eralized binary splitting [11] and Barinel [3], which are used
for noiseless and noisy environments respectively. We evalu-
ated the proposed framework by testing the exploitability of
real vulnerabilities on different configurations of the Linux-
based Metasploitable 2 machine [18]. Our results show that
Autosploit is able to identify the exact system configurations
that affect the exploitability of the system in both noiseless
and noisy environments.
We summarize our paper’s contributions as follows:
1. We present a fully automated framework that can be used
to evaluate the exploitability of security vulnerabilities
given a specific environment, thereby ensuring a more
accurate risk management process.
2. The proposed framework can identify the specific prop-
erties that are necessary for successful exploitation of a
given vulnerability. By knowing those properties, secu-
rity analysts can easily identify the hardening techniques
required to reduce the attack surface.
3. We suggest two algorithms that can be used to efficiently
search through various system configurations, and given
a security vulnerability, are able to identify the exact
system configurations that affect the exploitability of the
system in both noiseless and noisy environments. The
two algorithms are adapted from the domains of group
testing and software code diagnostics.
4. We develop a dedicated simulator that automates the
process of changing the system configuration, exploiting
the system, and collecting evidence with respect to the
success of the exploitation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we provide a brief introduction to group testing, and
the generalized binary splitting and Barinel algorithms. Then,
we formally define the notations and terms for the problem in
Section 3 and determine the set of system configurations that
can potentially affect exploitability in Section 4. In Section 5,
we present the proposed framework, providing a description
of the simulator developed and the algorithms used to effi-
ciently search through the possible system configurations. The
evaluation and results of the proposed method are presented
in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude our work and
suggest new research directions.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a brief introduction to group test-
ing and describe the generalized binary splitting and Barinel
algorithms.
2.1 Group Testing
Group testing is the process of identifying a subset of defec-
tive items among a large set of items. Testing each item in
the group individually to determine whether it is defective
or not is inefficient – O(n) for noiseless (deterministic) envi-
ronments and O(λ−1n) for noisy environments (in which the
same test may produce different results), where λ denotes the
probability for a test to produce incorrect results and n is the
number of items. In order to expedite the process of identify-
ing defective items, group testing algorithms test groups of
items simultaneously. The underlying assumption in group
testing is that the number of defective items is relatively small
(even asymptotically small) compared to the total number of
items. Hence, it is possible to reduce the number of opera-
tions by testing subgroups of items. The intuition for testing
subgroups is that if a test is negative, then all items in the
subgroup are considered to be flawless (or flawless with a
high probability in noisy environments), and therefore can be
eliminated from future examinations, thus accelerating the
search.
Group testing problems can be independently classified
into three categories: (i) probabilistic or combinatorial, (ii)
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adaptive or non-adaptive, and (iii) noisy or noiseless. The first
category refers to the a priori knowledge available on the
distribution of defective items: no knowledge (combinatorial)
or some probability distribution (probabilistic). Non-adaptive
group testing determines all tests in advance, while adaptive
group testing uses previous test results to determine the next
test. Finally, noiseless group testing assumes that the result
of a group test is accurate. On the other hand, noisy group
testing assumes that the result of a group test can be incorrect
with some probability.
Binary splitting is a well-known procedure to identify a
single defective item in a contaminated set of items. The
algorithm partitions a set of n items into two disjoint groups,
such that neither group’s size exceeds 2dlogne−1. Next, the
algorithm tests a group in order to determine which of the
groups is contaminated (i.e., includes defective items). Then,
it recursively applies binary splitting on the contaminated
group. The number of tests required for identifying a single
defective item using binary splitting is O(dlogne).
In this research, we adapt the generalized binary split-
ting [11, 13] algorithm to enumerate the environmental condi-
tions (configurations) that affect the exploitability of a system
in a noiseless environment.
2.2 Software Code Diagnosis
A significant part of the software debugging process is the
identification of faults and their location in the program code.
Although this process is crucial for “healthy” code, it is very
expensive [26]. These days, the scale of software code, com-
bined with its complexity, makes manual debugging almost
impossible. Consequently, there is a need for an automated
debugging tool.
Automatic fault localization techniques are a collection of
procedures for automatically identifying the faulty compo-
nents that cause a bug. Model-based diagnosis (MBD) is a
known approach for automated diagnosis that has also been
proposed for software diagnosis [23]. In MBD, a model of
the system is needed, along with observations of the sys-
tem’s behavior. These observations are checked against the
given model, and inference algorithms are used to produce
diagnoses, which are possible assumptions about which com-
ponents are faulty but consistent with the given model and
observations. However, software systems can rarely be mod-
eled accurately, and thus, directly applying MBD to software
diagnosis is unscalable [31].
Software fault localization (SFL) is a general approach for
fault diagnosis. In the context of software diagnosis, SFL oper-
ates by collecting the traces (i.e., set of components involved
in the execution) of the tests that were run. SFL methods
for software diagnosis suggest diagnoses by considering the
correlation between the passing and failing of tests and their
traces.
Barinel [3] is an algorithm that falls between MBD and
Figure 1: Illustrating the problem definition.
SFL that is specifically designed for software diagnosis. In
this research, we adopt the Barinel algorithm to enumerate the
environmental conditions that affect a system’s exploitabil-
ity. Barinel’s features allow us to identify the environmental
conditions that affect the exploitability of a system in a noisy
environment.
3 Problem Definition
This section formally defines the notations and terms for the
problem of searching a subset of environmental conditions
that are necessary for the exploitation, using exploit x of a
vulnerability v.
Definition 1. Environmental conditions are specific param-
eters of a system environment that can potentially affect the
exploitability of a vulnerability v with exploit x. The set of
environmental conditions is denoted by C = {c1, ...,cn}.
Definition 2. The set of environmental conditions that are
necessary for the exploitation of v by x is represented as R =
{r1, ...,rn} ∈ {0,1}n, where r j = 1 if environmental condition
c j is necessary for the exploitation and r j = 0 otherwise.
Example 1. The MS-RPC functionality in Samba version
3.0.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands
via shell meta-characters (CVE-2007-2447). The exploitation
of this vulnerability can be done by utilizing ruby or perl
interpreters (installed in the victim environment) to create
a reverse socket for initiating an interactive shell from the
victim environment to the attacker environment. Following
that, ruby and perl are specific characteristics of a user’s
environment that are necessary for the successful exploitation
of the vulnerability.
Definition 3. A tested environment is represented by E =
{e1, ...,en} ∈ {0,1}n, where e j = 1, if the environmental con-
dition c j is enabled in the environment and e j = 0 otherwise.
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Definition 4. A test, represented by the tuple 〈E,result〉, is an
attempt (trail) for applying x to exploit v given an environment
E. We distinguish between two types of testing: testing in a
noiseless (deterministic) environment and testing in a noisy
environment. When testing in a noiseless environment, the
result of a test is positive (equal to 1) if ∃ j : r j = e j = 1
and negative (equal to 0) otherwise. When testing in a noisy
environment, the result of a test may be negative (equal to 0)
with some probability ε even when ∃ j : r j = e j = 1.
Example 2. Figure 1 illustrates a specific test. The set of envi-
ronmental conditions considered in the test are firewall rules
(e.g., port 21 is open), services running (e.g., htt pd service
is running), and packages installed (e.g., ruby package in-
stalled). The tested environment outlines the specific setup of
the environment, subject to the environmental conditions. For
example, e1 = 1 and e2 = 0 indicate that the firewall within
the tested environment blocks communication via port 21
and allows communication via port 23. The result of the test
(result = 0) indicates that the vulnerability v, to which the
tested environment is exposed, can be exploited by x.
Objective. Find R with a minimal number of tests.
4 Determining the Environmental Conditions
Modern environments consist of multiple configurable pa-
rameters that may influence the security of the system (i.e.,
the ability to exploit existing vulnerabilities). Many of these
parameters (i.e., environmental conditions) are used for op-
erating system hardening. Thus, in order identify them, we
reviewed existing standards and guidelines for system harden-
ing (e.g., [12,19,21,29]). The list of environmental conditions
identified is summarized in Appendix A. The environmental
conditions are classified into five groups as follows:
Access control: The exploitability often depends on access
control misconfigurations. For instance, many exploits utilize
account misconfigurations, such as the use of weak passwords,
guest users, or accounts with empty passwords, to compro-
mise the system. File permissions are another example, since
many exploits utilize unauthorized data access to compromise
a system. Removing these user accounts, using a strong pass-
word policy, and correctly managing file permissions (i.e., the
principle of least privileges) reduces a system’s attack surface.
Connectivity: The ability to exploit a vulnerability remotely
(i.e., network attack vector) is heavily dependent on the con-
nectivity settings. For example, blocking incoming commu-
nication to a vulnerable application may prevent the ability
to exploit it; blocking the outgoing communication from a
target environment to the attacker machine can prevent re-
mote shell attacks. In addition, many attacks utilize the ICMP
protocol to compromise a system (e.g., flooding attacks). For
these reasons, restricting communication (e.g., using a fire-
wall) can reduce the attack surface and thus, directly affects
the exploitability of a system.
Services: Exploitation often depends on the services running.
For instance, the default configurations of f t p and rsh services
transfer usernames and passwords in plain-text, which can be
captured by an attacker. Other examples are the telnet and nis
services, which enable remote login without authentication.
Removing/disabling these services reduces the attack surface
and thus, directly affects the exploitability of a system.
Safeguards: Modern operating systems are equipped with
many security features, which can be used to prevent the ex-
ploitation of vulnerable applications. For example, data execu-
tion prevention (DEP [27]) prevents code execution from data
segments; address space layout randomization (ASLR [28])
makes it more difficult for an attacker to predict target ad-
dresses of a subroutine that is already present in the executable
memory of a process. Stack protectors detect buffer overflows
on stack variables (by using the canary value [7]). Enabling
these security features makes exploitation more difficult, thus
directly affecting a system’s exploitability.
Packages: Successful exploitation depends on the existing
packages installed in the target environment. Removing these
packages can prevent the attacker from exploiting a vulnera-
bility. For example, in a typical remote exploitation scenario,
the attacker initiates a remote shell connection to the target
environment, which listens for such connections. The netcat
package is the most common method used by attackers to
open a listening socket in the target environment. Therefore,
removing the netcat package can prevent such exploitations.
Considering all of the environmental conditions is impractical,
so identifying the set of environmental conditions necessary
to exploit a system is a crucial task.
5 The Proposed Framework
In this section, we present our framework – Autosploit– de-
signed to solve the problem described in Section 3. The ra-
tional behind Autosploit’s design is that in order to identify
the environmental conditions that affect the exploitability of a
given security vulnerability, one must actually test the exploit
on different environment configurations. In addition, since
modern environments consist of multiple configurable param-
eters that may influence the ability to exploit a vulnerability,
manual testing cannot be considered. Thus, a sophisticated
testing strategy should be considered in order to minimize
the number of tests required to solve the problem. To address
these challenges, Autosploit consists of two main components:
a simulator and an underlying algorithm (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: The architecture of Autosploit consists of two main
components: a simulator and an underlying algorithm. The
simulator automates the process of changing the system con-
figuration, exploiting the system, and collecting evidence re-
garding the success of the exploitation. The algorithm is re-
sponsible for efficiently operating the simulator. Specifically,
the algorithm determines the configuration of the environment
to be tested by the simulator.
5.1 The Simulator
The simulator we developed is a virtual environment imple-
mented using Docker containers [17]. The simulator consists
of three main modules (see Figure 2):
Victim (target environment). A Docker container installed
with a vulnerable application that is remotely exploitable (i.e.,
remote attack vector). The Victim is accessible through the
network to both the Attacker and the Agent. Our implementa-
tion of the simulator supports Linux-based victims. However,
the simulator can be easily extended to other platforms (e.g.,
Windows OS).
Attacker. The attacking environment is responsible for at-
tacking the Victim and collecting evidence with respect to the
success of the exploitation. In order to automate the process
of exploiting the target environment, the Attacker is imple-
mented via a Metasploit-framework Docker container. The
Metasploit-framework [14] is an open-source penetration test-
ing tool developed by Rapid7. The main reason for selecting
the Metasploit-framework as an attacking environment is its
support in the remote procedure call (RPC), which enables
pen testers to automate the exploitation process. Exploiting a
system using the Metasploit-framework is relatively simple
and includes four main steps:
1. Choosing and configuring an exploit: In this step, the
pen tester can select an exploit from the exploit database,
which includes about 2,000 exploits. Each exploit includes
several configurable parameters, such as the IP and port
of the target machine, username, and password (if the
exploitation requires authentication), etc.
2. Choosing and configuring a payload: In this step, the
pen tester should select a payload that is supported by
the selected exploit. Metasploit supports various types
of payloads (e.g., remote TCP shell, reverse TCP shell),
most of which are used to open a remote terminal with
the target environment. Each payload includes several
configurable parameters, such as the Attacker IP and port
(for reverse shell payloads).
3. Executing the exploit: In this step, the pen tester exe-
cutes the exploit.
4. Running post-exploitation tools: In this step, the pen
tester can execute post-exploitation scripts on the target
machine. We used post-exploitation tools to validate the
success of the exploitation. In our implementation, we val-
idate that a new session was created between the Attacker
environment and the target machine.
Agent. The Agent is responsible for controlling and orches-
trating the main process of the simulator. This process is
presented in Figure 3:
1. Attacker Configuration: In this step, the Agent chooses
the relevant exploit and payload to exploit the Victim.
The set of parameters used to configure the exploit and
payloads is determined based on the IP of the Victim,
the port of the vulnerable application, and the IP of the
Attacker; all other parameters are set to their default values
(as determined by Metasploit).
2. Information Gathering: The main objective of this step
is to determine the initial set of environmental conditions
that are relevant for the specific Victim. In the current
implementation of the simulator, the set of environmental
conditions is determined based on the services running,
open ports, packages installed, and file permissions in the
\bin directory.
3. Test Selection: In this step, the Agent sends the previous
test result to the Algorithm component, which responds
with a new set of environmental conditions that should be
tested by the simulator.
4. Victim Configuration: In this step, the Agent modifies
the environment configuration of the Victim. The mod-
ifications to the Victim machine are determined by the
Algorithm.
5. Execute Exploit: In this step, the Agent instructs the
Attacker to (a) exploit the Victim, and (b) collect evidence
with respect to the success of the exploitation.
5.2 Algorithm
The algorithm is responsible for efficiently operating the sim-
ulator. Specifically, given a set of previously executed tests
5
Start
Attacker
Configuration
Information
Gathering
Test Selection
Done?
Victim
Configuration
Exploit
Execution
End
No Yes
Figure 3: A flowchart that outlines the main process.
and their results, the Algorithm determines the specification
of the next test to be executed by the simulator (i.e., the config-
uration of the Victim machine for the next test). Note that in
our implemented framework each iteration with the simulator
(i.e., test) takes approximately 45 seconds; this demonstrates
the importance of operating the simulator efficiently for a
practical implementation.
As mentioned in definition 4, we distinguish between test-
ing in noiseless and noisy environments.
5.3 Testing in noiseless environments
When testing in noiseless environments, the result of a test is
deterministic. That is, the result of a test is positive (equal to
1) if ∃ j : r j = e j = 1 and negative (equal to 0) otherwise. In
order to solve the problem, we utilize the generalized binary
splitting algorithm, a combinatorial, adaptive, and noiseless
group testing algorithm.
Generalized binary splitting. The algorithm receives two
inputs (see Algorithm 1): a set of n items (denoted by S) and
an upper bound for the number of defective items (denoted
by dˆ). The output of the algorithm is a set of defective items
(denoted by D). The algorithm starts by checking whether the
number of remaining items is relatively close to the number
of remaining defective items (i.e., n ≤ 2d− 2). If yes, the
algorithm tests each item individually and returns the current
set of defective items (lines 4-7). Otherwise, the algorithm
tests a group of size 2α (where α= log n−dˆ+1
dˆ
); if the outcome
is positive, it applies binary splitting to identify one defective
Algorithm 1: Generalized binary splitting
Input :S set of items
Input :dˆ upper bound for the number of defective items
Output :D set of defective items
1 D← /0
2 n← |S|
3 while dˆ > 0 and n > 0 do
4 if n≤ 2dˆ−2 then
5 D← D∪ IndividualTesting(S)
6 break
7 end
8 else
9 l← n− dˆ+1
10 α← blog2(l/dˆ)c.
11 subgroup = GetSubgroup(S,2α)
12 test_result← Test(subgroup)
13 if (test_result = 0) then
// test is negative
14 n← n−2α
15 S← S\ subgroup
16 end
17 else
// test is positive
18 item, idx← BinarySplitting(subgroup)
19 n← n−1− idx
20 dˆ← dˆ−1
21 D← D∪{item}
22 S← S\GetSubgroup(S,1+ idx)
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 return(D)
item and i non-defective items (lines 8-24). This procedure
repeats until either n or dˆ are equal to zero.
Adapting our problem to group testing. In our modeling,
environmental conditions (denoted by C = {c1, ...,cn}) are
equivalent to items, while the defective items are equivalent
to the environmental conditions that are necessary for the
exploitation (denoted by R = {r1, ...,rn}). Accordingly, dˆ is
an upper bound on the number of environmental conditions
that are necessary for the exploitation.
Figure 4 illustrates the application of the generalized binary
splitting algorithm for finding the environmental conditions
that are necessary for the exploitation. As can be observed,
the algorithm starts by testing the first 2α0 environmental con-
ditions ((1)). Since not all of them are necessary for the ex-
ploitation, the test yields a negative result. Then, the algorithm
tests the next 2α1 environmental conditions ((2)). Since a sub-
set of them are required for the exploitation, the test yields
a positive result. Next, the algorithm applies binary splitting
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Figure 4: The application of generalized binary splitting for
finding the environmental conditions that are necessary for
the exploitation. Red/green circles represent environmental
conditions that are necessary/unnecessary for the exploitation
respectively. Red/green rectangles represent positive/negative
tests results.
((3)-(5)) to identify a specific environment condition that is
necessary for the exploitation. It should be noted that during
binary splitting not all of the subgroups are tested. Therefore,
some environmental conditions may be classified as may be
necessary for the exploitation. These types of environmental
conditions will be tested again as the search continues.
Time complexity. Given that the general number of environ-
mental conditions (denoted by n) is sufficiently larger than
the number of environmental conditions that are necessary for
the exploitation, generalized binary splitting can find all of
the defective items with dˆ · log(n/dˆ) tests. This dramatically
improves the naive use of binary splitting to find all defective
items (i.e., applying binary splitting d times), which requires
O(d · logn) tests.
Practical considerations. As mentioned above, generalized
binary splitting receives two inputs: a set of n items (denoted
by S) and an upper bound for the number of defective items
(denoted by dˆ). However, knowing (in advance) the exact
number of environmental conditions that are necessary for
exploiting the system is not trivial. Therefore, in practice, d is
often estimated or an upper bound. When dˆ is overestimated,
generalized binary splitting will identify all environmental
conditions that are necessary for the exploitation however not
as efficiently as when the correct value of d is assigned. On
the other hand, when dˆ is underestimated, generalized binary
splitting will identify up to dˆ environmental conditions that
are necessary for the exploitation, which may result in false
negatives. The common approach for identifying that dˆ has
been underestimated is to apply a test on all of the remaining
environmental conditions. If the result is positive, then dˆ was
underestimated. In that case, one would apply the generalized
binary splitting algorithm on the remaining environmental
conditions, while assigning a value of d′ to represent the
number of environmental conditions that are necessary for the
exploitation (among the remaining environmental conditions).
5.4 Testing in noisy environments
When testing in noisy environments, the result of a test
is not deterministic. That is, the result of a test may be
negative (equal to 0) with some probability ε even when
∃ j : r j = e j = 1. The reason for this non-deterministic be-
havior is because a successful change of an environmental
condition often depends on additional parameters which are
not considered during the test. For instance, the deletion of a
file may fail, if the file is currently under use by some process;
similarly, the deletion of a user may fail, if the user is run-
ning some process. In order to address the non-deterministic
(noisy) scenario, multiple noise models have been presented
in the group testing literature [5]. In this work, we consider a
specific variant of the dilution noise model, which addresses
the type of non-determinism mentioned above.
The dilution noise model for a test containing m items, l of
which are defectives, is provided by the following probability
transition function:
P(test = positive|m, l) = 1− εl
P(test = negative|m, l) = εl
(1)
Where ε is a noise parameter that estimates the probability for
a defective item to produce a correct result. The main draw-
back of this noise model, is that it cannot model environments
such that each environmental condition that is necessary for
the exploitation has different probability to produce negative
result. Therefore, in our application we consider the following
more realistic noise model:
P(test = positive|m, l) = 1−∏
ci∈l
εci
P(test = negative|m, l) =∏
ci∈l
εci
(2)
Where εci is a noise parameter that estimates the probability
for an environmental condition ci to produce a negative result.
We are not familiar with any literature of noisy adaptive group
testing that can handle such noise model. In order to solve this
problem, we developed a variant of the Barinel [3] algorithm
(coined Adaptive Barinel) that can be used to address this
specific noisy adaptive group testing setup.
Barinel. Barinel is an automated fault localization technique
specifically designed for software diagnosis. The key insight
used by Barinel (presented in Algorithm 3) is that if a test
fails, we can infer that at least one of the components (e.g.
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functions) in its trace is faulty. Thus, the trace of a failed
test is a conflict [22], which includes the components that
participated the trace. Obviously, since the test failed, at least
one of the components in the conflict is faulty. A hitting set
(i.e., minimal set cover [6]) of these failed tests is a diagnosis
[8], where a diagnosis is a set of faulty components that caused
the tests to fail. Barinel adopts Staccato [2] to generate the
hitting sets.
Barinel receives two inputs (see Figure 5a): An activity matrix
(denoted by A) of a size N×M, which describes the presence
or absence of each of the M components in the traces of each
of the N tests (having Ai, j = 1 indicates that component j is in
the trace of test i); and an error vector (denoted by e) of a size
N, which represents the corresponding test results (success/-
fail). These two inputs together are referred to as observations
(denoted by OBS). The Barinel’s output is a diagnostic report,
which includes a list of diagnoses and the likelihood for those
diagnoses to be correct. In order to produce the diagnostic
report (line 11), Barinel follows a Bayesian approach:
P(d|OBS) = P(OBS|d) ·P(d)
P(OBS)
(3)
That is, the likelihood for a diagnosis d to be correct is an
estimate of the posterior probability that d is the correct di-
agnosis given the observations OBS, where P(d) is the prior
probability of d being correct (i.e., representing the faulty
components) and P(OBS) is a normalization factor.
To compute P(OBS|d) (line 3), Barinel assumes that the tests
are independent and therefore can be computed as follows:
P(OBS|d) = ∏
obsi∈OBS
P(obsi|d) (4)
where obsi is a single observation, and the probability
P(obsi|d) is calculated as follows:
P(obsi|d)≡

∏
j∈d∧obsi
g j if obsi passed
1− ∏
j∈d∧obsi
g j if obsi failed
(5)
where g j is a goodness factor that describes the probability
that a faulty component j produces correct output.
Barinel estimates these goodness factors by solving an op-
timization problem in which the goodness factors are the
variables that are set so as to maximize P(OBS|d), using a
gradient ascent technique (line 9).
Adaptive version of Barinel. The textbook implementation
of Barinel cannot be used for our purposes for the follow-
ing reasons. First, Barinel receives all of the observations in
advance, in contrast to our adaptive framework which uses
the results of previous tests to determine the next test to be
executed. Second, Barinel’s objective is to generate a diag-
nostic report that explains the observations. In contrast, our
objective is to intelligently select the next tests to be executed,
while minimizing the total number of tests overall. In order to
address these differences, we developed an adaptive version
of Barinel (coined Adaptive Barinel).
One of the first challenges we faced when developing the
adaptive version of Barinel is very similar to the exploration-
exploitation trade-off, which is a well-known dilemma in
the fields of decision-making, recommendation systems, and
reinforcement learning [24]. Traditionally, the exploration-
exploitation trade-off confronts two contradicting approaches
in order to maximize the total gain (also known as the ex-
pected sum of rewards): Exploitation — repeat decisions/ac-
tions that have already operated properly in order to gain an
expected reward; and Exploration — explore novel decision-
s/actions, while expecting to gain a greater reward. We faced
a similar dilemma: Selecting a test that analyzes the compo-
nents that were already suspected as faulty, in order to further
confirm this suspicion, i.e., reduce false positives (which we
refer to as exploitation); or, selecting a test that explores new
components, in order to identify more components that may
be faulty, i.e., increase the number of true positives (which we
refer to as exploration). To overcome this challenge, we were
inspired by the ε−greedy strategy [30], which represents a
balance between exploration and exploitation.
Adaptive Barinel is presented in Algorithm 2. The algorithm
receives the following inputs: the set of components to be
considered during the test (denoted by M), an estimate of the
number of faulty components (denoted by dˆ), the exploration
ratio (denoted by ε), the decay factor (denoted by decay), the
minimal exploration ratio (denoted by εmin), the bootstrapping
length (denoted by b), and the decoding frequency (denoted
by f ). The output of the algorithm is a set of components and
the likelihood of them to be faulty (denoted by P). The algo-
rithm starts by calculating 2α, which determines the number
of components that will be considered in each test (line 1); this
is done similar to the generalized binary splitting algorithm.
Then, the algorithm randomly samples b tests, where each
test considers 2α components (that is, in each row in A only
2α indexes are set to 1); and executes those tests to receive
the corresponding error vector (lines 3-4). We refer to this
phase as bootstrapping, since the algorithm only performs
exploration. Next, the algorithm applies Barinel to receive a
diagnostic report. Since the diagnostic report will probably
not change dramatically in each iteration and the application
of Barinel is time-consuming, we apply Barinel every f itera-
tions. Given the diagnostic report, we calculate the likelihood
of each component to be faulty (line 8). This is done according
to Equation 6.
P(c) = ∑
d∈D
{
P(d), c ∈ d
0, c 6∈ d (6)
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Based on the diagnostic report, we select dˆ components that
have highest probability (line 9). These components will be
used by the ε− greedy strategy. Specifically, in the explo-
ration phase, we randomly sample a single test by consider-
ing 2α components from M−T (line 12). In the exploitation
phase, we sample a single test by considering a single com-
ponent from T (line 15). The rational behind this sampling
technique is to use group testing to accelerate exploration and
individual testing to reduce the number of false positives.
Adapting our problem to software fault diagnosis. In our
modeling (see Figure 5b), environmental conditions (denoted
by C = {c1, ...,cn}) are equivalent to the tested components,
while a faulty component (denoted by ¬h) is equivalent to an
environment condition that is necessary for the exploitation
(denoted by R = {r1, ...,rn}). Similarly, a tested environment
(denoted by E = {e1, ...,en}) is equivalent to a trace.
Specifically, a tested component Ai, j = 1, if during the ith test,
the environment condition c j was enabled (c j = 1), and vice-
versa. Correspondingly, within the error vector ei = 1 if the
tested environment E is not exploitable, and vice versa.
Time complexity. A theoretical lower bound is not yet to be
presented for the dilution noise model. Furthermore, when
the algorithm is based on sampling, theoretical analysis is
very challenging. Therefore, in practice, such algorithms are
mainly evaluated empirically through simulations. An empiri-
cal evaluation of the Adaptive Barinel algorithm is presented
in Section 6.4.
In addition to sampling, our algorithm uses Barinel to gen-
erate diagnostic. Here we evaluate the time complexity for
this operation. Barinel includes three main (computationally
heavy) procedures:
1. Generating the set of diagnoses: The set of diagnoses,
which is defined as the hitting sets over the traces of
failed tests, is calculated using the Stoccato algorithm.
The time complexity of Stoccato is estimated to be O(N ·
M).
2. Health probability estimation: The health probability,
which determines the likelihood that a faulty component
generates a correct result, is calculated using maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) via gradient ascent. The
time complexity of the MLE is independent of the size of
N and M, yielding a constant time complexity (denoted
by C).
3. Sorting the diagnostics in the report: The report is
ordered in descending order. It can be assumed that for
large systems |D| would scale with M. Therefore, the
time complexity for sorting the report is M · log(M).
Thus, given an activity matrix of size N×M, Barinel’s com-
plexity is O(M ·N+M · log(M)). It should be mentioned that
it is reasonable to assume that much less effort is required to
run Barinel than to perform a test.
(a) Original input as presented in [3]
(b) The inputs given our modeling
Figure 5: Inputs to the Barinel algorithm
Practical considerations. As mentioned above, Adaptive
Barinel receives the following seven inputs: M, dˆ, ε, decay,
εmin, b, and f . In this section, we discuss the considerations for
determining these parameters. Based on our experiments, the
balance between exploration and exploitation is crucial for an
efficient search. Specifically, on the one hand, insufficient ex-
ploration will result in low recall. However, on the other hand,
insufficient exploitation will result in an inefficient search.
The parameters that are responsible for balancing exploration
and exploitation are ε, decay, εmin, and b.
Another important parameter is the decoding frequency ( f ).
Naturally, a high decoding frequency will result in a more
accurate assessment. However, it can be very time-consuming
and unnecessary, since the diagnostic report probably won’t
dramatically change in each iteration.
Last but not least is the dˆ parameter, which is an estimator for
the number of faulty components. Based on this parameter,
the algorithm determines the number of components included
in each test. Concretely, on the one hand, selecting dˆ such that
n
dˆ
is relatively small will result in tests with a large number
of components. On the other hand, selecting dˆ such that n
dˆ
is relatively large will result in tests with a large number of
components.The intuition behind this parameter is that if n
dˆ
is
relatively small, then the probability that a faulty component
will be included in a test is also small. Therefore, we can
accelerate the search by conducting tests with a large number
of components. On the other hand, if n
dˆ
is relatively large, then
the probability that a faulty component will be included in
a test is also large. Therefore, tests with a small number of
components should be considered.
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Algorithm 2: Adaptive Barinel
Input :M set of components
Input : dˆ an estimate for the number of faulty
components
Input :ε exploration ratio
Input :decay decay factor
Input :εmin minimal exploration ratio
Input :b bootstrapping length
Input : f decoding frequency
Output :P set of components and the likelihood of them
to be faulty
1 α← blog2( n−dˆ+1dˆ )c.
2 i← 0
// bootstrapping
3 A← RandomSample(M,2α,[|M|,b])
4 e← Test(A)
5 repeat
6 if i% f == 0 then
7 D← Barinel(A,e)
8 P← ProbabilitySummation(D)
9 T← top(dˆ,P)
10 end
11 if RandomSample([0,1])< ε then
// exploration
12 test← RandomSample (M−T ,2α,[|M|,1])
13 end
14 else
// exploitation
15 test← RandomSample (T ,1,[|M|,1])
16 end
17 e← e ∪ Test (test)
18 A← A ∪ test
19 i← i+1
20 ε← max(εmin,ε∗decay)
21 until Convergence criteria is met;
22 return(P)
6 Evaluation
6.1 Vulnerabilities and exploits tested
We evaluated Autosploit using the following vulnerabilities
and exploits:
CVE-2007-2447: Improper input validation in the MS-RPC
functionality in Samba server versions 3.0.0 - 3.0.25rc3 al-
lows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via remote
injection of shell commands.
CVSS classifies this vulnerability as medium severity, with
a base score of 6.0, impact score of 6.4, and exploitability
score of 6.8. The reason for the medium exploitability score
is because the exploitation can be performed with medium
Algorithm 3: Barinel
Input :A Activity Matrix
Input :e Error Vector
Output :D Diagnostic report
1 D← Staccato((A, e))
2 for d ∈ D do
3 prob← GeneratePr((A, e), dk)
4 idx← 0
5 Pr[d][idx]← 0
6 repeat
7 idx← idx+1
8 for j ∈ d do
9 g j← g j +α ·∇prob[g j]
10 end
11 Pr[d][idx]← Evaluate(prob,∀ j∈dk g j)
12 until |Pr[d][idx]−Pr[d][idx−1]| ≤ ε;
13 end
14 return sort(D, Pr)
complexity (i.e., the vulnerability can only be exploited in
specific configurations, which are not the default) over the
network and requires a single authentication (i.e., exploiting
the vulnerability requires one instance of authentication).
This vulnerability can be exploited using the exploit/mul-
ti/samba/usermap_script Metasploit module. This module
exploits the vulnerability by initiating an anonymous call
with Linux shell commands to the SamrChangePassword()
MS-RPC function (in combination with the "username map
script" option) The unescaped shell commands are passed as
arguments to /bin/sh allowing for remote command execution.
CVE-2010-2075: Backdoor in UnrealIRCd version 3.2.8.1
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.
CVSS classifies this vulnerability as high severity, with a base
score of 7.5, impact score of 6.4, and exploitability score of
10. The reason for the high exploitability score is because the
exploitation can be performed with low complexity, over the
network, without any authentication.
This vulnerability can be exploited using the exploit/unix/ir-
c/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor Metasploit module. This mod-
ule exploits the vulnerability by opening a socket to the Victim
machine and sending the backdoor command — the string
"AB" followed by Linux shell commands. Those commands
are handed off directly to system(), a C library function that
passes the command to the host environment to be executed
by the command processor.
CVE-2011-2523: Backdoor in vsftpd version 2.3.4 allows
remote attackers to open shell on port 6200.
CVSS classifies this vulnerability as critical, with a base score
of 10.0, impact score of 10.0, and exploitability score of 10.0.
The reason for the high exploitability score is because the
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exploitation can be performed with low complexity, over the
network, without any authentication.
This vulnerability can be exploited using the exploit/unix/ft-
p/vsftpd_234_backdoor Metasploit module which adds a ":)"
smiley face into the username that triggers the machine to
open a shell on port 6200 by executing /bin/sh.
CVE-2011-3556: Misconfiguration in the Java Runtime En-
vironment in Java SE JDK and JRE version 7 allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary code.
CVSS classifies this vulnerability as high severity, with a base
score of 7.5, impact score of 6.4, and exploitability score of
10.0. The reason for the high exploitability score is because
the exploitation can be performed with low complexity, over
the network, without any authentication.
This vulnerability can be exploited using the exploit/multi-
/misc/java_rmi_server Metasploit module. The exploit takes
advantage of the RMI distributed garbage collector available
from every RMI endpoint, which allows loading classes from
any remote (HTTP) URL.
6.2 Evaluation setup
Victim machine: A docker container running Linux Ubuntu
8.0.4. The container is based on Metasploitable 2 [18], an
intentionally vulnerable virtual machine, which is exposed to
the vulnerabilities described in Section 6.1.
Agent implementation: In our implementation of the Agent
(which is based on the DeepExploit [25] tool) the following
actions are supported:
1. Services: Stopping a service using the etc/init.d stop
service_name utility.
2. Packages: Deleting a package using the dpkg -r pack-
age_name utility.
3. Connectivity: Changing firewall rules, i.e., blocking
network ports using the iptables port INPUT/OUTPUT
-p PROTOCOL –destination-port port -j DROP utility.
4. Access control: Changing file permissions using the
chmod utility, e.g., restricting the access to files in \bin
directory.
It should be mentioned that our Agent implementation can
be extended to support additional actions. Given those three
actions, the number of environmental conditions that were
considered in the evaluation is 675. Since some actions may
affect the operation of the simulator, we created a Blacklist
that prevents the execution of some predefined actions. For
instance, the simulator uses the dpkg package to delete pack-
ages, thus removing the dpkg package will affect the operation
of the simulator. For this reason, we put such actions (dpkg
-r dpkg) in the Blacklist. After removing blacklisted actions,
the number of environmental conditions considered in the
evaluation was decreased to 642.
System setup: The evaluation was conducted on a 64-bit
Windows server 2008 R2 Enterprise machine, with a 2.00
GHZ Intel Xeon CPU (version E5-2620, 24 logical cores)
and 64 GB of RAM. The entire framework is implemented
in Python. Specifically, the simulator and generalized binary
splitting algorithm were implemented in Python 3.6, and the
Adaptive Barinel algorithm was implemented in Python 2.7.
The communication of the Agent and the Attacker docker
container is performed via the RPC protocol. The communi-
cation of the Agent and the Victim container is performed via
the docker SDK for Python. The communication of the Agent
and the Algorithms is performed via TCP sockets.
6.3 Testing in noiseless environments
In this evaluation scenario, we assume that our environment
is noiseless, i.e., the result of a test is positive (equal to 1) if
∃ j : r j = e j = 1 and negative (equal to 0) otherwise. Given
that, we selected the generalized binary splitting algorithm to
operate the simulator.
The results of the assessment are presented below:
CVE-2007-2447: The proposed framework identified that a
successfull exploitation of this vulnerability is rooted in the
ability of the exploit to pass unescaped Linux shell commands
as arguments to /bin/sh. In order to do so, the user running
the vulnerable application (in this case the vulnerable samba
daemon) must have privileges to run /bin/bash (or /bin/sh).
Thus, this vulnerability cannot be exploited in environments
that restrict the execute privilege of /bin/bash, such that the
user running the vulnerable application will not be able to
open a shell.
In addition, the framework identified that the payloads avail-
able utilize two different approaches when compromising
the system: First, using third party libraries (telnet, netcat,
openssl, and socat) to create an interactive shell from the Vic-
tim environment to the Attacker environment. Second, using
scripting languages, such as ruby and perl, to open a network
socket between the Attacker and Victim machine and use it
as a communication channel to a local terminal (i.e., by redi-
recting STDIN and STDOUT). Thus, it is more difficult to
exploit this vulnerability in environments that do not include
netcat, OpenSSL, socat, Ruby, or Perl.
CVE-2010-2075: The proposed framework identified that a
successfull exploitation of this vulnerability is rooted in the
ability of the exploit to pass Linux shell commands to the
system() C library function, which opens a shell and run the
commands. In order to do so, the user running the vulnerable
application (in this case the vulnerable IRC daemon) must
have privileges to run /bin/bash (or /bin/sh). Thus, this vulner-
ability cannot be exploited in environments that restrict the
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execute privilege of /bin/bash, such that the user running the
vulnerable application will not be able to open a shell.
In addition, the framework identified that the payloads avail-
able utilize two different approaches when compromising the
system: First, using telnet to create an interactive shell from
the Victim environment to the Attacker environment. Second
using scripting languages, such as ruby and perl, to open a
network socket between the Attacker and Victim machine and
use it as a communication channel to a local terminal (i.e., by
redirecting STDIN and STDOUT). Thus, it is more difficult to
exploit this vulnerability in environments that do not include
telnet, ruby, or perl packages.
CVE-2011-2523: The proposed framework identified that a
successful exploitation of this vulnerability is rooted in the
ability of the exploit to (1) open a listening socket on port
6200, and (2) use this socket as a communication channel
between the Attacker machine to a local terminal (i.e., by
redirecting STDIN and STDOUT) opened via a call to the
execl() C library function with the path /bin/sh as a parameter.
Thus, this vulnerability cannot be exploited in environments
that (1) restrict incoming connections on port 6200, or (2) that
restrict the execute privilege of /bin/bash, such that the user
running the vulnerable application (vsftpd service in this case)
will not be able to open a shell.
In addition, the framework identified that by removing the
libselinux1 package, the vulnerability cannot be exploited.
According to information on the Debian website,1 libselinux1
provides an API for SELinux applications for get and set pro-
cess and file security contexts and to obtain security policy
decisions. Despite our in depth examination of this, we were
unable to fully understand why removing that package pre-
vents the exploitation. The main insight from our analysis
is that during the authentication process vsftpd (indirectly)
calls some SELinux API function, which does not exist when
the libselinux1 package is removed. Surprisingly, the vsftpd
application did not crash, but we assume that the source code
of the backdoor is no longer reachable, thus preventing the
exploitation.
CVE-2011-3556: The proposed framework identified that a
successful exploitation of this vulnerability is rooted in the
ability of the exploit to access the Java RMI server (running
on port 1099), which is enabled by default in Java SE JDK
and JRE below version 7. Thus, this vulnerability cannot be
exploited in environments that restrict incoming connections
on port 1099.
In Figure 6 we evaluate the performance of the generalized
binary splitting algorithm, given different values of dˆ. We
compared the results with the alternative approach of applying
the binary splitting algorithm d times. As can be seen, when
dˆ is relatively close to d, the generalized binary splitting
1https://packages.debian.org/sid/libselinux1
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Figure 6: The performance of the generalized binary splitting
algorithm compared to the binary splitting algorithm at differ-
ent (dˆ) upper bound values. The green curve represents the
true number of environmental conditions that are necessary
for exploitation of the vulnerability.
algorithm produces better results. However, when dˆ largely
overestimates d, the binary splitting algorithm produces better
results.
6.4 Testing in noisy environments
In this evaluation scenario, we assume that our environment
is noisy (i.e., the result of a test may be negative (equal to 0)
with some probability ε even when ∃ j : r j = e j = 1). In order
to evaluate the performance of the Adaptive Barinel algorithm
when dealing with noise, we conducted a controlled experi-
ment in which we simulated noise at different volumes. For
each environmental condition ci, we sampled the noise param-
eter εci from a Gaussian distribution, i.e., εci ∼ |N (µ, σ2)|,
where µ and σ are the parameters of a Gaussian distribution
which determines the mean and standard deviation of the
simulated noise volume.
In our experiments, we tested the following four noise
distributions: N (µ = 0.05 ,σ = 0.05), N (µ = 0.1 ,σ =
0.05), N (µ = 0.15 ,σ= 0.05), N (µ = 0.2 ,σ= 0.05). For
each noise distribution we tested the recall and precision of
the algorithm for the task of identifying the environmental
conditions that are necessary for the exploitation of the vul-
nerabilities described in Section 6.1.
The results presented in Figure 7 reveal very interesting in-
sights. First, the Adaptive Barinel algorithm is able to achieve
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perfect recall and precision at all noise distributions, however
at high amount of noise, achieving such results takes more
iterations. For instance, when observing the performance of
the algorithm on CVE-2007-2447, we can see that achieving
a recall of one takes about 200 iterations when µ = 0.05 and
about 600 iterations when µ = 0.2. Second, a very surprising
insight is that the precision does not depend on the noise dis-
tribution. That is, even at high amount of noise, the algorithm
does not produce false positives.
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Figure 7: The performance of the Adaptive Barinel algorithm
in identifying the environmental conditions that are necessary
for the exploitation of different vulnerabilities at different
noise volumes (in terms of recall, precision, and number of
tests).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we present Autosploit, a novel framework and
method for evaluating the exploitability of security vulnerabil-
ities given a specific environment. As part of this framework,
we developed a simulator that automates the process of chang-
ing the system’s configuration, exploiting the system, and
collecting evidence with respect to the success of the exploita-
tion. In addition, we suggested two algorithms that can be
used to efficiently operate the simulator in both noiseless and
noisy environments.
Given a vulnerable environment and relevant exploit, Au-
tosploit can identify the specific environmental properties
necessary for a successful exploitation. With this knowledge,
security analysts can evaluate the exploitability of their sys-
tem by considering their environment’s configuration, rather
than by taking generic considerations (such as the exploitabil-
ity metric presented in CVSS) into account, contributing to a
more accurate risk management process. Furthermore, these
properties can indicate the specific hardening techniques re-
quired to reduce the attack surface.
As future work we suggest the following research direc-
tions:
Extending the simulator: The current implementation of
the simulator supports four types of actions (see Section 6.2).
Extending the simulator with additional actions, such as those
presented in Appendix A, enables a more thorough analysis
of the vulnerability and exploit.
Utilizing prior knowledge: The current implementation of
the algorithms does not consider any prior knowledge on the
vulnerability, exploit, or environmental conditions. We be-
lieve that utilizing prior knowledge (e.g., using reinforcement
learning algorithms) can accelerate the search.
Additional environments: The current implementation of
the simulator supports Linux-based operating systems. We
plan to extend the framework to support testing and evaluating
the exploitability of Windows-based operating systems.
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A Environmental conditions that may affect the exploitability of vulnerabilities.
Group Environmental condition Enabled environmental condition
Access Control
User accounts
Remove/Add guest users
Remove/Add users with empty passwords
Remove/Add users with naive passwords
Lock/Unlock users
Status of mandatory access control (MAC) Enable/Disable SELinux Kernel
File permissions
Allow/Prevent users to read/write system files
Use noexec, nodev, nosuid on network services
Prevent users from writing to /boot directory
Root users Add/Delete users with UID=0Add/Remove users from sudoers group
Status of root login Modify the /etc/passwd file
Separating user from OS Move /proc, /bin, /sbin to a second disk partition
Connectivity
Open ports Open/Close telnet and ftp ports
Status of encryption Enable/Disable VPN or GnuPG
Status of ICMP or broadcast requests Modify the relevant kernel variable for blocking
ICMP message
Services
Running services Run/Stop Web services
Status of isolation mechanisms Enable/Disable chroot
Safeguards
Status of memory protection mechanisms Enable address space layout randomization (ASLR)
Status of stack protectors Enable Canary
Packages Installed packages Delete flash playerStatus of desktop environments Enable/Disable KDE/GNOME
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